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COMMENTS
THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY IN LOUISIANA
As American society has progressed, increasing emphasis
has been placed upon the protection of individual rights. This
trend has prompted American courts to recognize what is gen-
erally known as the "right of privacy." Although many legal
writers have dealt with the right of privacy,1 much confusion
still exists from state to state as to its nature and to what extent,
if any, courts will afford it protection against violation. This
Comment is designed to examine the development and applica-
tion of the right of privacy by Louisiana Courts.
Recognition and Definition of the Right
Louisiana, one of the majority of states recognizing the
right of privacy,2 first dealt with the question in an 1811 deci-
sion8 which effectively protected the right of privacy, though
not expressly describing it as such. By 1906 the right of privacy
was expressly recognized by name in at least two Louisiana
decisions.4 Later decisions have held that the right of privacy
is protected under the broad coverage of article 2315 of the Civil
Code 5 and that a violation of this separate and distinct legal
right is tortious in nature.0
Our courts' definitions of this offense have been somewhat
obscure. Under one definition the right of privacy consists of
1. Brittan, The Right of Privacy in England and the United States, 37
TUL. L. REv. 235 (1963); Feinberg, Recent Developments in the Law of
Privacy, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 713 (1948); Green, The Right of Privacy, 27 ILL.
L. REV. 237 (1932); Ludwig, "Peace of Mind" in 48 Pieces vs. Uniform Right
of Privacy, 32 MINN. L. REV. 734 (1948); Nizer, The Right of Privacy, 39
Micm. L. REV. 526 (1941); Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALI. L. REV. 383 (1960);
Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890); Yank-
wich, The Right of Privacy, 27 NOTRE DAME LAw. 429 (1952).
2. McAndrews v. Roy, 131 So.2d 256, 258 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961); W.
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 112, at 831 (3d ed. 1964); 41 Am. JUR. Privacy § 5,
at 927 (1942); Annot., 138 A.L.R. 22, 28 (1942).
3. Denis v. Leclerc, 1 Mart. (O.S.) 297 (1811) (defendant enjoined from
publishing a letter, annexed a copy of It to his answer, and by a newspaper
advertisement invited all who wished to see the letter to call at the clerk's
office, held in contempt of the injunction); see Bennett, Injunctive Protection
of Personal Interests-A Factual Approach, 1 LA. L. REv. 665, 680 (1939);
Note, 21 TUL. L. REv. 639, 640 (1942).
4. Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 115 La. 479, 39 So. 499 (1905), second appeal,
117 La. 708, 42 So. 228 (1906); Schulman v. Whitaker, 115 La. 628, 39 So. 737
(1905), second appeal, 117 La. 704, 42 So. 227 (1906).
5. Which, in pertinent part, states: "Every act whatever of man that
causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair
it.,
6. Tuyes v. Chambers, 144 La. 723, 81 So. 265 (1919); Pack v. Wise, 155
So.2d 909 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963); Quina v. Roberts, 16 So.2d 558 (La. App.
Orl. Cir. 1944).
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the right to live one's life in seclusion without being subjected
to unwarranted and undesired publicity, or simply the right to
be let alone.7 According to another, the right of privacy is the
right to live without unwarranted interference by the public
in matters with which the public is not necessarily concerned.8
A third definition envisions the right of privacy as a part of the
general right of the immunity of the person, similar to the
right not to be defamed and the right not to be maliciously
prosecuted.9 One court in discussing the various attempts at
defining the right of privacy stated that each definition conveys
but one meaning, that being the right to an inviolate person-
ality. 10
Determining When Relief Should Be Granted for an
Invasion of the Right
These definitions because of their very broad language are
of little, if any, assistance to a court in resolving a case involving
the right of privacy. In order reasonably to limit the area of
protection afforded under the right of privacy, the courts in
Louisiana, either expressly or tacitly, have distinguished between
"actual" and "actionable" invasions of the right of privacy with
legal redress being granted only when the invasions are deemed
to be actionable." Since this distinction is the crucial determi-
nate of whether recovery will be allowed, much discussion will
be devoted to the test used by the courts to ascertain whether
certain conduct is an actionable invasion of the right of privacy.
As employed by the courts, the word "actual" describes conduct
for which no recovery will be granted even though such conduct
may seem to invade the right of privacy as that right has been
so broadly defined.
It is evident that malicious intent is not necessary in order
to have an actionable invasion of the right of privacy, and that
truth and the absence of malice are not defenses to such an
7. Pack v. Wise, 155 So.2d 909, 913 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963); McAndrews
v. Roy, 131 So.2d 256, 258 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961); Souder v. Pendleton De-
tectives, Inc., 88 So.2d 716, 718 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1956); Hamilton v. Lumber-
men's Mut. Cas. Co., 82 So.2d 61, 63 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1955).
8. See cases cited note 7 supra.
9. See cases cited note 7 supra.
10. Hamilton v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 82 So.2d 61, 63 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1955).
11. Cunningham v. Securities Investment Co. of St. Louis, 278 F.2d 600,
602 (5th Cir. 1960); Pack v. Wise, 155 So.2d 909, 913 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963);
Reed v. Orleans Parish School Board, 21 So.2d 895, 897 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1945).
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action.12 In determining the criterion for liability the courts
have looked to what was done rather than the precise motives
which accompanied the acts. A few Louisiana decisions18 have
referred specifically to section 867 of the American Law Insti-
tute's Restatement of Torts as the test to be used in determining
whether certain conduct constitutes an actionable invasion of
the right of privacy. 14 Section 867 provides:
"A person who unreasonably and seriously interferes
with another's interest in not having his affairs known to
others or his likeness exhibited to the public is liable to
the other." (Emphasis added.)
Explicit in section 867 is a test of reasonableness with regard
to the conduct in question. Other decisions without specifically
referring to Section 867, have applied this test by balancing the
interests of the defendant in pursuing his course of conduct
against the interest of the plaintiff in having his privacy pro-
tected.-5 Under the reasonableness test a defendant may lawfully
act in a reasonable manner even though this conduct may to a
slight degree result in an actual invasion of the plaintiff's right
to privacy. When the court determines that the defendant's
conduct is unreasonable and seriously interferes with the plain-
tiff's privacy, there is an actionable invasion of the right of
privacy. As the issue of reasonableness always depends upon
the specific facts of each case, no rigid rules can be established
for the resolution of future cases. However, a review of the
jurisprudence is helpful in demonstrating what conduct the
courts have considered reasonable or unreasonable.
12. Cunningham v. Securities Investment Co. of St. Louis, 278 F.2d 600,
604 (5th Cir. 1960); Tuyes v. Chambers, 144 La. 723, 730, 81 So. 265, 267
(1919); Quina v. Roberts, 16 So.2d 558, 560 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1944).
13. See Cunningham v. Securities Investment Co. of St. Louis, 278 F.2d
600, 604 (5th Cir. 1960); Pack v. Wise, 155 So.2d 909, 912 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1963).
14. In Pack v. Wise, 155 So.2d 909, 912 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963), the court
also referred to RESTATEMENT OF TORTS SECOND § 46, Tentative Draft No. 1
(adopted 1957). Section 46 reads: "One who by extreme and outrageous con-
duct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another
is subject to liability for such emotional distress and for bodily harm result-
ing from it." However, this was the only decision found which expressly
referred to Section 46.
15. Cunningham v. Securities Investment Co. of St. Louis, 278 F.2d 600,
602 (5th Cir. 1960); Pack v. Wise, 155 So.2d 909, 913 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963);
Souder v. Pendleton Detectives, Inc., 88 So.2d 716, 718 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1956); Reed v. Orleans Parish School Board, 21 So.2d 895, 897 (La. App. Orl.
Cir. 1945).
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Louisiana Jurisprudence
The Louisiana cases have been divided into three groups.
The first group consists of cases involving debt collection, and
the second covers the general publication and disclosure of
private matters, names, and photographs. The last group of cases
involves physical intrusions and interference with social rela-
tions.
Debt Collection
In this area the courts clearly recognize a creditor's right
to collect his debts legally due, but they have required that the
collections be made in a reasonable manner. A creditor has been
found guilty of an actionable violation of his alleged debtor's
right of privacy when, after receiving a letter from the alleged
debtor's attorney expressly informing him of a defense to the
claim and that his client desired no more intrusion by the credi-
tor into his employment relationship, the creditor subsequently
brought such letter to the attention of the alleged debtor's
employer. Plaintiff, who had lost $2,000 in earnings because of
discharge from his employment, was awarded $5,000 for the
creditor-defendant's invasion of his right of privacy. 6 Appar-
ently, the court found that the debtor's interest in being secure
in his employment relationship outweighed any interest the
creditor may have had in coercing payment of the disputed debt
by exerting pressure on the debtor through his employer.
In a similar case, it was held that a creditor's sending a
letter enclosing a "Final Notice Before Suit" requesting the
debtor's employer's assistance in collecting the $1.45 balance of
a debt was an unreasonable invasion of the debtor's privacy.
The debtor was awarded $100 for his creditor's tort.17 Another
debtor was awarded $500 for an actionable invasion of her pri-
vacy when a creditor had her name published on a list of de-
linquent debtors and threatened to advertise the list by dis-
playing it in merchants' store windows.'8 The court found the
creditor's threat to be clearly coercive and, therefore, unreason-
able.
16. Pack v. Wise, 155 So.2d 909 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 245
La. 84, 157 So.2d 231 (1963); see Note, 24 LA. L. REv. 953 (1964); The Work of
the Louisiana Appeliate Courts for the 1963-1964 Term--Torts, 25 LA. L. Rzv.
341 (1965).
17. Quina v. Roberts, 16 So.2d 558 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1944).
18. Tuyes v. Chambers, 144 La. 723, 81 So. 265 (1919).
472. [Vol. XXVIHI
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On the other hand, a routine call by a creditor to verify
employment and to ascertain the employer's policy toward gar-
nishment has been held to be reasonable and, therefore, not an
actionable invasion of the debtor's right of privacy.19 No action-
able invasion was found when the creditor's agent inquired of
the debtor's doctor whether he could speak with the debtor
about her past due car notes while she was recovering from a
heart attack.20 The doctor refused the request and told the
debtor's son, who later informed the debtor of the request. In
denying the debtor a recovery, the court stated that no case in
Louisiana or elsewhere has held that these facts or any similar
thereto amount to an actionable invasion of the right of privacy.21
General Publication and Disclosure of Private Matters,
Names, and Photographs
In order to protect effectively an individual's right of pri-
vacy, the publication of private letters has been enjoined.22 A
defendant who published "before" and "after" pictures of the
plaintiff purporting to show his development after having taken
the defendant's physical improvement course, approximately
ten years after plaintiff had gratuitously given his consent to
the use of such pictures, was found guilty of an actionable in-
vasion of plaintiff's privacy. The court determined that de-
fendant acted unreasonably in not seeking a renewal of plain-
tiff's consent to the publication and awarded plaintiff $1,000 for
the invasion of his right of privacy. 3
Two decisions have clearly established that when the pub-
lication of an accused person's picture in a rogues' gallery is not
necessary to prove his guilt or for identification of his person,
such publication may be enjoined on the grounds that it would
constitute an actionable invasion of the accused's right of pri-
vacy.24 In further protecting the right of privacy the court en-
joined unauthorized publication of a petition signed by plain-
tiffs, under a misrepresentation and later repudiated as no
19. Columbia Fin. Corp. v. Robitcheck, 142 So.2d 625 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1962), modified, 243 La. 1084, 150 So.2d 23 (1963).
20. Cunningham v. Securities Investment Co. of St. Louis, 278 F.2d 600
(5th Cir. 1960).
21. Id. at 602.
22. Denis v. Leclerc, 1 Mart.(O.S.) 297 (1811).
23. McAndrews v. Roy, 131 So.2d 256 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
24. Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 115 La. 479, 39 So. 499 (1905), second appeal,
117 La. 708, 42 So. 228 (1906); Schulman v. Whitaker, 115 La. 628, 39 So. 737
(1905), second appeal, 117 La. 704, 42 So. 227 (1906).
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longer representing objectives desired by plaintiffs.25 It was
found unreasonable to allow the defendants to use plaintiff's
petition since it had been signed because of a misunderstanding.
Our Supreme Court in overruling an exception of no cause of
action indicated that the unauthorized publishing in a newspaper
of a marvelous cure given a patient may be an actionable in-
vasion of the physician's right of privacy.26
In a leading case, an insured recovered $3,000 from his lia-
bility insurer for an invasion of his privacy when the insurer
without authorization used the insured's name in a newspaper
advertisement seeking information concerning an automobile
accident in which the insured had been involved.2 The court
recognized the right of liability insurers to make reasonable
investigations of accidents, but determined that the use of an
advertisement which contained the insured's name, address, and
phone number was unreasonable. Another decision in which the
individual's right of privacy was protected held that the plaintiff
in conducting an investigation of alleged discriminatory insur-
ance rates could not compel the defendant to deliver private
papers which were not kept in fulfillment of a public duty.2s
However, a questionnaire issued by a school board during
wartime requiring teachers to disclose their war work was found
to be reasonable and not an actionable invasion of the teacher's
25. Schwartz v. Edrington, 133 La. 235, 62 So. 660 (1913). The court
stated: "The question .. . in the case thus cited [State ex rel. Liversey v.
Judge, 34 La. Ann. 741 (1882)] was whether the relators had been properly
condemned to imprisonment for having violated an injunction prohibiting
them from publishing certain "false, malicious, and libelous cartoons and
editorial paragraphs,' to the alleged irreparable injury of the applicant for
the writ." Id. at 240, 62 So. at 662.
"What they were enjoined from doing was the publication of a petition
purporting to be signed by, and which was in fact, signed by, the plaintiffs
in injunction, and purporting to be their petition, but which was not their
petition, because, having signed it under a misapprehension, they disavowed
and repudiated it, and no longer desired that to be done which it was the
purpose of the petition to accomplish." Id. at 241-42, 62 So. at 662-63.
26. Martin v. The Picayune, 115 La. 979, 40 So. 376 (1906).
27. Hamilton v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 82 So.2d 61 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1955); see Note, 16 LA. L. REV. 275 (1956).
28. Jung Hotel, Inc. v. Insurance Comm'n of La., 179 La. 551, 154 So.
448 (1934). The court in this decision protected the right of privacy on the
ground that it was a constitutional right. Plaintiff complained that his in-
surance rates were excessive and sought to have the Insurance Commission
adopt a different scheme of classification than it had previously enacted.
Pursuant to this claim, plaintiff demanded that the Commission issue an
order requiring the filing of certain information, so that after examining
this information, the Commission would change the classification. The court
held that plaintiff could not invoke the court's power to investigate the
private papers of insurance companies which were not kept in fulfillment
of a public duty.
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right of privacy.29 The court stressed that the information was
necessary in altering the school curriculum so as not to inter-
fere with war work, and that the questionnaire would not seri-
ously violate the teacher's right of privacy. Likewise, the re-
cordation of a mineral lease containing the names of all joint
owners including the plaintiffs, although plaintiffs had not signed
the lease, does not constitute an actionable invasion of plain-
tiffs' privacy.30 Implicit in this holding is the court's recognition
of the reasonableness of and the necessity for the execution of
counterpart mineral leases. A doctor and a hospital have been
held not to have violated a patient's right of privacy by disclos-
ing communications and medical records once the patient had
instituted a suit in which the communications and records were
necessary, admissible, and relevant for prosecution or defense
of the suit.3 ' This holding seems consonant with the position
that there is no doctor-patient privilege in civil suits in Louisi-
ana.32 The court emphasized the fact that a suit had been insti-
tuted and left open the question of whether or not a patient
would have a valid cause of action for the invasion of his privacy
when no suit is pending.
The parents of a boy who was killed by a knife-wielding
assailant sued the publisher and distributor of a magazine which
contained an article relating the events surrounding his death
on the ground that the publication violated their right of pri-
vacy. The court in denying recovery held that the contents of
the article were of public interest, newsworthy, and, therefore,
were privileged.33
Physical Intrusions and Interference with Social Relations
In. overruling an exception of no cause of action, the court
clearly indicated that an insurer and its detective agency would
be liable for an actionable invasion of plaintiffs' right of privacy
if, in fact, the detectives had violated the "Peeping Tom" stat-
ute34 by trespassing on plaintiffs' property and looking into their
29. Reed v. Orleans Parish School Board, 21 So.2d 895 (La. App. Orl.
Cir. 1945).
30. Nunez v. Collins, 180 So.2d 553 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
31. Pennison v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 154 So.2d 617 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1963).
32. Moosa v. Abdalla, 248 La. 344, 178 So.2d 273 (1965); see Note, 27 LA.
L. REv. 361 (1967).
33. Mahaffey v. Official Detective Stories, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 251 (W.D.
La. 1962).
34. LA. R.S. 14:284 (1950).
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windows.8 5 A squatter who had for many years possessed two
acres of land was denied recovery for an alleged invasion of his
privacy when a realtor with the consent of the record owner
placed a "for sale" advertisement sign on the property.86 Appar-
ently the court felt it more reasonable to allow the realtor to
rely on the consent of the property owner as reflected by the
public records, rather than to require dealing with a squatter
whose possible prescriptive title remained untested.
Home owners, whose homes had been damaged by defen-
dant's blasting operations, were awarded $250 each for an action-
able invasion of their privacy. 7 In granting the award the court
held that the invasion of plaintiffs' privacy constituted distinct
damages separate from the physical damage to their homes.
Apart from physical intrusions, it has been stated that it is the
right of every man to enjoy social relations with his friends
and neighbors and that the person unlawfully deprived of this
right is entitled to redress.38 This right to social relations is a
logical extension of the area protected under the privacy theory.
In resolving a suit of this nature the court could and apparently
should balance any interest the defendant may have had in in-
terfering with plaintiff's social relations against plaintiff's inter-
est in not having his social relations interfered with unreason-
ably. If the interference in light of the actual facts of the case
is unreasonable and serious, the plaintiff should then be entitled
to relief.
Remedies Available in Protecting the Right of Privacy
As indicated by the previous discussion, once the court de-
termines that the defendant's conduct constitutes or will con-
stitute an actionable invasion of plaintiff's privacy, two remedies
are available. First, Louisiana courts on several occasions have
granted injunctions prohibiting conduct that would constitute
an actionable invasion of plaintiff's privacy.8 9 Second, a plaintiff
35. Souder v. Pendleton Detectives, Inc., 88 So.2d 716 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1956).
36. White v. Authement, 104 So.2d 273 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1958).
37. Fontenot v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 227 La. 866, 80 So.2d 845 (1955).
38. Deon v. Kirby Lumber Co., 162 La. 671, 680, 111 So. 55, 58 (1926).
Plaintiff alleged defendants asked its employees in a group meeting not to
trade with plaintiff or visit his store, or associate with his family. The court
said that if these allegations were true a violation would result. See Note,
21 TUL. L. REv. 639, 640 (1942).
39. Schwartz v. Edrington, 133 La. 235, 62 So. 660 (1913); Itzkovitch v.
Whitaker, 115 La. 479, 39 So. 499 (1905), second appeal, 117 La. 708, 42 So.2d
228 (1906); Schulman v. Whitaker, 115 La. 628, 39 So. 737 (1905), second
appeal, 117 La. 704, 42 So. 227 (1906); Denis v. Leclerc, 1 Mart.(O.S.) 297
(1811).
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is entitled to a money judgment in tort for an actionable viola-
tion of his privacy.4° In regard to money judgments both special
and general damages have been awarded.41 While special dam-
ages may be recovered for an actionable invasion if such damages
were sustained as alleged, general damages may be recovered
even though no special damages have been alleged or proved.42
Special damages have been awarded for specific identifiable
injury such as loss of earnings,43 while courts in fixing the
quantum for general damages have considered the degree of
embarrassment, humiliation, loss of self-esteem, injury to repu-
tation, physical and mental pain and suffering sustained by the
plaintiff. 44 At least one court expressly45 and others by implica-
tion46 have recognized mitigating circumstances which may be
considered in fixing the quantum of damages.
Conclusion
Louisiana courts expressly recognize the right of privacy.
It has been generally defined as the right to be left alone and a
violation of this right constitutes a tort under article 2315 of the
Civil Code. In order properly to limit and administer the right
of privacy, the courts have drawn a distinction between actual
and actionable invasions of the right with relief being granted
only for actionable invasions. A test of reasonableness is used
to make the distinction. This test contemplates a balancing of
the defendant's interest in pursuing his course of conduct against
the plaintiff's interest in having his privacy protected from seri-
ous invasions. Injunctions, special and general damages have
40. McAndrews v. Roy, 131 So.2d 256 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961); Hamilton
v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 82 So.2d 61 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1955).
41. See Pack v. Wise, 155 So.2d 909 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
42. Tuyes v. Chambers, 144 La. 723, 730, 81 So. 265, 267 (1919); Pack v.
Wise, 155 So.2d 909, 912 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963); Quina v. Roberts, 16 So.2d
558, 560 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1944); see also McAndrews v. Roy, 131 So.2d 256
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
43. Pack v. Wise, 155 So.2d 909, 916 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
44. Fontenot v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 227 La. 866, 880, 80 So.2d 845,
850 (1955); Pack v. Wise, 155 So.2d 909, 916 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963); Quina v.
Roberts, 16 So.2d 558, 561 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1944).
45. Hamilton v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 82 So.2d 61, 65 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1955). The mitigating factor was that since the accident was of such a
serious nature that an immediate and complete investigation would have
aided both plaintiff and defendant.
46. Cunningham v. Securities Investment Co. of St. Louis, 278 F.2d 600,
602 (5th Cir. 1960) (court recognized that defendant had the right to make
reasonable efforts to have the indebtedness liquidated); Souder v. Pendleton
Detectives, Inc., 88 So.2d 716, 718 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1956) (court recognized
Insurer's right to investigate any and all possible claims which might be
filed against it).
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been granted to protect the right of privacy. Special damages do
not have to be alleged or proved in order to recover general
damages. Truth and the absence of malice are not defenses to
an action for an invasion of the right of privacy. The publication
of newsworthy matters of public interest is privileged and will
not constitute an actionable invasion.
The court's task in resolving right of privacy cases is a
difficult one. For while protecting the right of privacy, the courts
must be careful not to restrict unduly reasonable and proper
conduct in the pursuit of business and other legitimate objec-
tives even though that conduct may at times conflict with the
individual's right to privacy. In the final analysis, Louisiana
courts have performed admirably in this difficult area of the law.
James Fleet Howell
